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Disclosure of Specific Types of Ideas:
Misappropriation
Homer C. McRae*
N ORMAL PROCEDURE in attempting sale of a valuable idea is
for the claimant to offer his idea for sale to the recipient
who usually will refuse to buy it until disclosure. Then, after
disclosure, the recipient may or may not promise to pay for the
idea if he uses it. In either case, the recipient may use the idea
later, perhaps in a modified form, and refuse to compensate the
claimant.
Lack or Failure of Consideration
(a) Past Consideration
In Fulton v. Varney,' the claimant alleged that he recom-
mended the recipients for certain work to be performed, and
notified the recipients, and that they agreed to pay the claimant
one-half of the profits arising out of the work to be performed,
in consideration of the recommendation. The Court said that if
after receipt of the information and recommendation, the recipi-
ents promised to pay for these services, the consideration was a
past one and could not support the contract. However, if the
claimant was to supply the information after the recipients prom-
ised to pay for the information, the pleading was insufficient
because performance by the claimant was not averred.
In another case it was agreed between the claimant and the
recipient, at the time of the conveying of certain information as
to the availability of certain bonds for purchase by the recipient,
that the recipient would pay the claimant a reasonable commis-
sion for finding the bonds and conveying the information. The
Court said:
This allegation, that performance and promise were contem-
poraneous, alleges present consideration. . . . It is sufficient
to make out a cause of action that a valid, present considera-
tion, the giving of the information concerning the where-
abouts of the bonds, is alleged.
2
However, a dissenting opinion stated:
All that is really pleaded is a promise made in consideration
of benefits theretofore rendered without a request by the
promisors, express or implied. Such a promise is invalid.
3
*Research Engineer at the North American Mfg. Co., Cleveland; second
year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 117 App. Div. 572, 102 N. Y. S. 608 (1907).
2 Gellert v. Dick, 277 N. Y. 123, 125, 127, 13 N. E. 2d 603, 604 (1938).
3 Id., 277 N. Y., at 128, 13 N. E. 2d, at 605.
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These two cases are the exception to the rule: The difficulty
with disclosing the idea as a consideration before the agreement
is made, oddly enough, does not usually arise as an issue. In
Brunner v. Stix Co.,4 the claimant devised a plan for increasing
the number of department store charge accounts by means of a
prize contest among the employees of the department store to
secure new customers. The plan set forth the means and meth-
ods for conducting the contest. The plan was presented to the
recipient, who asked the originator of the plan what he wanted
for it. Since the plan had never been tried, the claimant asked
the recipient to try it to see how effective it might be, and then
some arrangement for settlement could be made. The recipient
agreed. The plan was tried with success, but no compensation
was paid the claimant. Recovery was allowed, the Court saying:
The case does not pivot on an unauthorized use of an as-
serted property right, common law or statutory, in a dis-
closed idea, but on a contract to pay for the authorized use of
a disclosed idea. Plaintiff was under no legal obligation to
make his plan known. He disclosed it in consideration of a
promise given and received as the equivalent in value for
its disclosure.5
Notice that last sentence in the opinion completely ignores the
facts of the case: the disclosure was made before any promise
was given.
The difficulty with past consideration is now overcome by
statute6 in New York. This makes past consideration valid for
supporting a contract, if the consideration is expressed in writing
and is proved to have been given.
(b) Failure of Consideration
In Soule v. Bon Ami Co., the claimant of an idea obtained an
agreement before disclosure, from the recipient, to pay him one
half of the profits resulting from the use of the idea. The recipi-
ent manufactured a product known as "Bon Ami." The whole-
sale price was $10 per gross, and the grocers retailed it for 10¢
per package. The suggestion was to increase the wholesale price
to $10.50 or $10.80, but to retain the retail price, thus increasing
profits for the manufacturer without losing sales. Only the
grocer would lose profits. The claimant was satisfied that this
could be done because it had been done to a similar product in
the face of keen competition. The manufacturer adopted the plan
with increased profits, but refused to pay anything to the origi-
nator of the idea. Recovery was denied. The Court said:
The central idea here was an obvious one .... There was no
monopoly on the idea that an increase in price would result
4 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S. W. 2d 643 (1944).
Id., at 352 Mo. 1232 181 S. W. 2d 646.
6 N. Y. Pers. Prop. L. § 33, Subdiv. 3.
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in an increase in profits. This was not new or original. The
very nature of the offer suggests that the information must
be new. To call attention to a fact already known is not im-
parting information.'
In another case an agreement was obtained for five percent
commission to be paid to the originator of an idea, if used. This
agreement was made before disclosure. The recipient was a rail-
road company. The idea was to sell advertising space (sale by
the railroad) and to display the advertisements on its railway
stations, depots, rights of way, cars, and fences. The plan was
used, resulting in income of several millions of dollars, but no
commission was paid for the idea. Prior to disclosure, no adver-
tising had been displayed as suggested. Recovery was denied the
claimant. The Court took judicial notice that the idea of selling
advertising space is common knowledge.8
In Futter v. Paramount Pictures, the idea was submitted,
to a motion picture company, of making short moving picture
features in color, with offscreen comment, depicting unusual jobs,
photographed at the actual location and using the title "Odd
Jobs." No recovery was obtained because it was not novel or
original.9
In another case an interesting situation is presented in which
the idea or information is unknown by the recipient, but the in-
formation is open to public knowledge in public records. Is this
idea novel and sufficient consideration for supporting a contract?
An agreement was made before disclosure to pay the claimant
thirty-five percent of all refunds and future savings resulting
from disclosure of certain information to the recipient. The in-
formation was a section of the Internal Revenue Code which
exempted the payment of telephone excise taxes by anyone en-
gaged in the dissemination of news for the public press, such as
the recipient of the information. In refusing to pay the claimant,
the recipient argued that the disclosure of a public statute does
not involve secret or confidential information. The Court held
otherwise, however:
While the idea disclosed may be common or even open
to public knowledge, yet such disclosure if protected by con-
tract, is sufficient consideration for the promise to pay.10
The case law of business ideas thus includes a requirement
similar to that of patentable novelty. If the idea is not novel,
there is failure of consideration because the claimant does not
render performance by imparting information which is already
known. From the writer's experience in the field of patentable
ideas or inventions, a great deal of controversy exists over
7 201 App. Div. 794, 796, 195 N. Y. S. 574, 575, 576 (1922).
8 Masline v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 95 Conn. 702, 707, 112 A. 639, 640 (1921).
9 69 N. Y. S. 2d 438, 440 (1947).
10 High v. Trade Union Courier Pub. Corp., 69 N. Y. S. 2d 526, 529 (1946).
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whether an idea is novel. Yet no cases were found on this point.
The difficulty arises from two different views of examining ideas:
from hindsight or foresight. It seems that after an idea is dis-
closed, the recipient who understands it, and sometimes even
when he does not understand it, concludes that he could also
have originated the idea; and then, he illogically concludes that
the idea was not novel after all. In fact, sometimes, even after
the originator of an idea has spent considerable time, effort and
study to come up with a solution to a problem, he is likely to
think that there is nothing novel about the idea, merely because
it was derived from well known laws of engineering.
(c) Implied Contract
If no promise is given by the recipient to pay the claimant,
either express or implied, there is lack of consideration and no
contract. The difficulty before the courts is in determining
whether an implied promise exists as indicated by the conduct
of the recipient in using the idea. Does the use of the idea imply
a promise to pay for the disclosure?
In Haskins v. Ryan," the claimant studied the situation of
the white lead industries outside a certain company and formu-
lated a plan for combining them in one company. Executing the
plan would require several million dollars. He also procured
options on such industries, or opened negotiations for their pur-
chase. He laid the plan before the recipient, a capitalist, seeking
his co-operation and aid, himself agreeing to contribute in part,
if the recipient would join him therein. The recipient expressed
a willingness to join him if an examination of the plan and papers
by the recipient's attorneys and experts confirmed the statements
made. The recipient, however, using the information furnished
by the claimant, organized his own company, controlled the in-
dustries and made a large profit. The claimant was not paid for
his idea. Recovery was not allowed on the theory of property,
which is discussed below. This situation also, in effect, did not
imply any promise by the recipient.
In contrast with that case, in Ryan v. Century Brewing As-
sociation,12 several advertising agencies were invited to submit
suggestions for an introduction of the recipient's product, beer.
The claimant did submit various ideas, among them the phrase,
"The Beer of the Century," inasmuch as the name of the recipi-
ent's company was "The Century Brewing Association." A limit-
ed disclosure only was made, coupled with an express warning
forbidding the gratuitous use of the ideas submitted. The phrase
was used with success, but the claimant was not employed or
paid. Recovery was allowed, a jury having found that an implied
promise was made to pay a reasonable value for use of the idea.
Was the court influenced by the solicitation by the recipient for
"1 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 A. 436 (1906).
12 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053 (1936).
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ideas or by the claimant's warning against gratuitous use? What
did the claimant's warning have to do with recipient's use of the
idea or the implied promise?
Many companies will refuse to make any agreement before
the disclosure of an idea. In this case it is best for the claimant
to take his idea elsewhere. Of course, many ideas are only use-
ful to one company. In Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., the
claimant wrote the recipient that he had an idea to correct a de-
fect in the design of the Chevrolet car, and he invited their offer
for disclosing the idea. The recipient refused to offer or make
any agreement before disclosure, but did suggest that the claim-
ant send signed, dated and witnessed drawings; if sufficient inter-
est were found to warrant further investigation, some mutually
satisfactory agreement would be made. Then the claimant, with-
out any drawings, voluntarily disclosed his idea: too much weight
on the left side of the car caused it to sag; to correct this situa-
tion, strengthen the springs on the left side, or shift some of the
individual units to the right side for better balance. The recipi-
ent answered that it was not advisable to change the design at
this time and that they would go no further into the matter. The
claimant alleged that the recipient did use the ideas he submitted.
He brought an action for an implied contract to pay a reasonable
value for the ideas. Recovery was denied, partly because the
idea was not novel or useful, but also because the facts indicated
no promise to pay.13
Some companies accept ideas only on the understanding that
the use by the recipient and the compensation to be paid, if any,
are to rest solely within the discretion of the recipient. In Davis
v. General Foods Corp.,14 the claimant wrote a letter to the re-
cipient, explaining that she had an idea for a new food product
and form of merchandising it. The reply was made that the re-
cipient would be glad to examine the idea only with the under-
standing that the use to be made of it, and the compensation, if
any, were matters resting solely in the discretion of the recipient.
The claimant did disclose her idea, which was used by the recipi-
ent without giving compensation. Again, no recovery was allow-
ed, either on an implied-in-fact contract or quasi-contractually.
The letter was so indefinite as to terms that it could not result
in a binding obligation. If the claimant trusts the fairness and
liberality of the recipient, there is not only no contract but no
reliance upon the supposed contract, and so no legal obligation
at all.
Quasi-Contract
The theory of quasi-contract is rarely applied to the cases on
ideas. It would seem that in many cases it is the only theory
upon which the claimant could rest his cause of action. If there
13 70 F. 2d 345, 347, 348 (8th Cir. 1934).
14 21 F. Supp. 445 (S. D. N. Y., 1937).
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is no express or implied promise by the recipient to pay the
claimant, or if a promise is given after disclosure, nevertheless,
the circumstances may be such that the recipient knew that the
claimant expected to be paid, and that the recipient had become
unjustly enriched. In Davis v. General Foods Corp.,15 the quasi-
contract theory was correctly applied by the court. There the
claimant could not definitely be expected to be paid if the idea
were used.
Ideas as Property
If ideas were property, some of the difficulties mentioned
would be eliminated. Past consideration and implied promises
would not arise as issues. The claimant could merely license the
use of the idea or revoke it at will. He could also contract with
respect to the use of the idea. However, generally the courts do
not recognize property in ideas. Notice that the opinion stated in
Brunner v. Stix Co.,16 denies any property right in the disclosed
idea, but then contradicts itself by saying that there is a con-
tract to pay for the use of the idea. If a contract could be made
to use an idea, there would be control over the idea and this
would be a property right.
About the only instance where the courts will admit a prop-
erty right in ideas is before they are disclosed. At this point the
claimant has complete dominion over the idea and therefore it
is property. However, once the idea is disclosed, it ceases to be
property. This is very well stated in the opinion of Brunner v.
Stix Co., thus:
Executory contracts for the rendition of such services are
valid. A distinction exists between physical and mental ef-
forts in that the former produces corporeal and the latter in-
corporeal results. Property rights in a corporeal thing are
not lost with the disclosure or exhibition of the physical de-
vice. The owner may follow a chattel and assert his prop-
erty therein. An idea, sometimes likened to ferae naturae,
does not have physical attributes and escapes the creator's
dominion when uttered. It may not ordinarily be followed
after disclosure, yet, as long as the creator of an idea refuses
to disclose it, he exercises dominion over it.'
7
The courts distinguish between abstract and concrete ideas
in relation to property. In Williamson v. N. Y. Central R. Co.,
the claimant based his claim to compensation on letters disclos-
ing the idea of the production and staging of a miniature railroad
at the New York World's Fair. In denying recovery, the Court
said:
15 Ibid.
16 Supra note 5.
17 352 Mo. 1225, 1232, 181 S. W. 2d 643, 646 (1944).
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An implied contract to do so does not arise therefrom, be-
cause the letters merely contain an abstract idea which may
not be made the subject of property right in the absence of
protection thereof by an express contract prior to dis-
closure.' 8
In another case an insurance agent suggested to a son-in-law
that he pay his father-in-law's premiums on life insurance poli-
cies. The father-in-law could no longer make the payments. In
a short time, the father-in-law died, making a substantial profit
for the recipient of the idea. The agent then claimed ten percent
of the profit made, as reasonable compensation for this idea. Re-
covery was denied. The Court said:
An idea which never takes concrete form at the time of dis-
closure, even if novel, is not the subject of a property right
or of contract. 19
In O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, a claimant submitted the
idea of a motion picture based on the colorful story of the Palace
Theatre and the old vaudeville characters. Four different pos-
sible suggestions were made for story treatment. All four were
described with the utmost brevity. Recovery was denied, not
only because of absence of a contract prior to disclosure, but
also because:
... an author has no property right in his ideas unless the
same are given embodiment in a tangible form (and) . . .
the idea was too abstract and general to give rise to a claim,
even if copied.2 0
In another case a plan was suggested to a recording company
to induce world famous artists to produce recordings without
royalty, their compensation to be on the reasonable value of their
services. The recordings were to be sold without the names of
the artists annexed to them, at a price so low that persons of
modest means could buy them. Sale and distribution were to be
effected not by dealers, but by newspapers as a cultural and civic
service. The idea was used, but the claimant was not compen-
sated. Again recovery was denied on the basis:
... that in the absence of an express contract, owing to the
difficulties of enforcing such right, the courts have uniformly
refused to assume to protect property and ideas that have
not been reduced to a concrete fornm. 2 1
In Alberts v. Remington Rand,22 the claimant suggested that
the manufacturer of electric shavers make a chart of the direc-
is 258 App. Div. 226, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 217 (1939).
1, Anderson v. Distler, 173 Misc. 261, 265, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 674, 678 (1940).
20 68 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S. D. N. Y., 1946).
21 Plus Promotions v. RCA Mfg. Co., 49 F. Supp. 116, 118 (S. D. N. Y., 1943).
22 175 Misc. 486, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 892 (1940).
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tions in which the hairs on each individual's face grow; then
issue the resulting charts to prospective customers as an aid in
the sale and use of the electric shaver. The idea was appropriat-
ed by the recipient without payment of compensation. The Court
held that this idea was not reduced to concrete form, and in the
absence of an express agreement, the claimant could not recover.
In Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Belt, a plan was disclosed to the
Assistant Superintendent of Public Schools for weekly broad-
casts of student talent selected by holding auditions in the high
schools. Each show would be presented first to the student body
as an assembly, recorded, and the recording broadcast in the
evening. A school atmosphere would be retained, and a different
school would be featured each week. The program would include
several pieces by the glee club in addition to the talent. The
show was subject to the supervision of the school authorities.
The claimant of the idea reserved the right to negotiate with any
school, radio station, or sponsor as well as all other rights. A
sponsor contracted with the claimant to employ him to make the
necessary arrangements with the schools. Later, a revised agree-
ment was to be made if the sponsor approved the programs.
However, the school authorities did not at first give the necessary
approval. So the sponsor canceled its contract, paying $50 in full
and final payment. After a few months, the school authorities
advised the sponsor of their willingness to approve such a pro-
gram. The sponsor, without the assistance of the claimant, broad-
cast the programs for over a year. The claimant recovered
damages, the Court holding that the plan was concrete:
... in the field of radio broadcasting, concreteness may lie
between the boundaries of mere generality on the one hand
and, on the other, a full script containing the words to be
uttered and delineating the action to be portrayed. Where
the plan is for a series of broadcasts the contents of which
depend upon selection of talent at different times, a detailed
program cannot be presented at the preliminary stages of
negotiation. This should not in and of itself deprive the
originator of a property right in his plan.2 3
In using the abstract and concrete theory of ideas, the courts
are influenced by the fact that frequently a mere idea is easy to
think of but difficult to carry out. Hence, a "substantial per-
formance" test is made in labeling an idea as concrete. There-
fore, it is recommended that the originator of an idea work out
the idea in as much detail as possible.
From the holdings of the "abstract and concrete" cases, it
would appear that (1) if the idea is abstract but an agreement
is made before disclosure, a recovery will be allowed, or (2) if
the idea is concrete and an agreement is made after disclosure a
recovery will be allowed. The second possibility has been dis-
23 210 F. 2d 706, 709 (D. C. Cir., 1953).
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cussed above under the section on past consideration. The first
conclusion could not be found as a holding in any case, only as
dicta.
Substantiating the theory that there is no property right in
a disclosed idea, independently of any contractual relationship,
is the case of Hughes v. West Publishing Co. The claimant origi-
nated and published a key number system in his textbooks,
relating to fundamental legal principles, practice and procedure.
He illustrated the system with the picture of a key to a Yale lock.
There were no contractual relations, no negotiations, and no
fiduciary relation between the claimant and the recipient, who
merely adopted the system in publishing its law books, textbooks,
digests and serial reporters. The claimant did not aver any dam-
ages resulting, and did not claim to be in competition with the
recipient. In denying an injunction to restrain the use of the sys-
tem of legal study, the Court said:
... there is no authority holding that at common law there
is a property right in a system, device, plan or scheme.
24
In the Haskins v. Ryan case, the question before the Court
was whether the claimant had a property right in the ideas in
his plan as well as a property right in his manuscript as a com-
bination of words. The Court reasoned:
... The combination of words and figures in the plan be-
longs to him absolutely. Its publication or reproduction or
exhibition in any form may be enjoined. But the idea con-
tained in the plan differs... It involves the voluntary action
and co-operation of many different men... Such a project or
idea can scarcely be called property. It lacks that dominion-
that capability of being applied by its originator to his own
use-which is the essential characteristic of property . . . it
has never, in the absence of contract or statute, been held,
that mere ideas are capable of legal ownership and protec-
tion.
25
Contrary to the theory that the claimant loses his property
right in the idea after it is disclosed is the theory of "limited
disclosure." In Ryan v. Century Brewing Association26 the prop-
erty right in the idea was the basis upon which recovery was
permitted. However, the difficulty in this case is that it was an
implied contract. When was the contract binding? Was it before
or after disclosure?
In making a contract, it is wise to protect against possible
disclosure by the recipient to third parties, as well as use by the
recipient. More explicitly, the recipient should agree to treat the
matter in the strictest confidence and to make no disclosure or
24 225 Ill. App., 58, 65 (1922).
25 Supra, note 11, at 71 N. J. Eq., at 579, 580, 64 A. at 438.
26 Supra note 12.
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use, unless and until the claimant and the recipient may mutually
agree on a basis of compensation. Disclosing an idea in confi-
dence or sometimes in "trust and confidence" could be defined as
a limited disclosure. It means that the idea does not escape to
the public at large and is not lost. This, in effect, treats the idea
as property, even though it has been disclosed to a limited num-
ber of persons.
In Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, claimant bought a
business, part of which was a secret process for manufacturing
bells. A foreman of the original owner of the company had
knowledge of the secret process and attempted to start a business
of his own, using the secret process. The Court granted an in-
junction against the foreman, saying:
A court of equity will protect the inventor of a secret process
against its disclosure or unauthorized use by any person ob-
taining knowledge of it in confidence.
The inventor may sell the secret to another, and vest in
his assignee as full right to protection from disclosure or use
by persons acquiring knowledge of it in confidence, as he
himself would have.2 7
Even though a disclosure has been made in confidence, if be-
fore or after disclosure, the scheme is put into authorized opera-
tion and released to the public, the idea escapes and is lost for-
ever. In Stein v. Morris, the claimant had a special banking plan
which he had put into effect for some years, making it known
to the public. The claimant approached the recipient with the
request that they should unite in organizing a similar savings
association at another location, which they did. The effort failed,
and their connection ended. Sometime later, the recipient or-
ganized a similar savings company which became quite success-
ful. The claimant asked for an accounting and an injunction to
restrain the recipient from using his plan. Aside from the fact
that the plans used by the claimant and recipient were not iden-
tical, the Court said:
If the claimant had originated the scheme or idea of banking
of which he claims to be the owner, he could not have a
property right in such a method or idea for conducting busi-
ness without any physical means or devices for carrying it
out. In other words, he could not put such an idea into op-
eration without it at once escaping his own grasp and be-
coming the property of mankind.28
The question then arises as to how limited must the dis-
closure be, to how many persons, and under what circumstances,
so that it does not escape to the public. This has happened many
times in the writer's experience. The claimant approaches sev-
2T7 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154, 155 (1887).
28 120 Va. 390, 394, 91 S. E. 177, 179 (1917).
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eral companies with the same idea. The purpose is to sell to the
highest bidder, or possibly to sell to more than one company. No
case on ideas could be found, but by analogy from common law
copyright, in White v. Kimmell, a manuscript in mimeograph
form was distributed at random to anyone, including strangers
who asked for a copy. There were only about two hundred copies
made and distributed, but the author requested that it was not
to be distributed in published form. The Court intrepreted this
to mean in book form and held that it was unlimited publication
and therefore in public domain, and could be quoted by anyone
without infringement. The Court said:
A limited publication which communicated contents of a
manuscript to a definitely selected group and for a limited
purpose and without right of diffusion, reproduction, distri-
bution or sale is considered a "limited publication" which
does not result in a loss of the author's common law right
to his manuscript; but that the circulation must be restricted
both as to persons and purpose, or it cannot be called a pri-
vate or limited publication.
29
Summary
A claimant who wishes to protect his idea when selling it
should observe certain rules. First, he should work out the idea
in as much detail as possible and make sure that it is novel.
Next, an agreement should be made before disclosing the idea.
The claimant promises to disclose the idea in return for the re-
cipient's promise to pay a reasonable value for it or to pay a
percentage of the commission or profits resulting therefrom. The
recipient should also promise to pay a nominal amount of money
for the disclosure in order to establish a definite consideration.
In this manner, the recipient can be convinced that he does not
have to use the idea and he has little or nothing to lose by mak-
ing the agreement.
As an additional precaution, the recipient should promise to
treat the idea in confidence and not disclose it to third parties.
If the recipient refuses to make an agreement before dis-
closure, the claimant should point out before disclosure that he
expects to be paid if the idea is used.
29 193 F. 2d 744, 746, 747 (9th Cir., 1952).
As to protection of ideas when organizing a corporation to exploit an
idea, see, 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, ch. 5 (1958).
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